INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
The methodology will be qualitative and threefold in nature arguing that the vested interest of the United States within a past foreign election is determined by analyzing three key variables: the tactics used by the United States in the intervention, the motivations of the United States to intervene in a foreign election, and the magnitude of the intervention.
These variables will be analyzed in the context of three landmark electoral The Vested Interest Theory interventions by the United States at three different periods of history:
First will be the 1948 Italian election, second will be the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections, and the third will be the 2002 Bolivian election. These specific elections were picked are because of their historical significance and the range of reasons that the United States used to justify becoming involved in the elections provides insight into how the United States conducts covert or overt political espionage, helping us arrive to conclusions on their multivariable incentive. The range of the dates of occurrence of these elections also provides insight into how the United
States' decision-making process evolves from the inception of the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1947 to current.
Tactics and methodologies (variable 1; displayed as V 1 ) will answer the question of how the United States intervened in these elections. They are outlined as whether they intervened covertly or overtly in the election in question. The motivations (variable 2; displayed as V 2 ) will answer why the United States intervened in these elections and their justification.
This variable will utilize Corstange and Marinov's theory of two types of foreign intervention: Partisan intervention and process intervention, which is defined later. 4 The application of these categories will set the foundation of which we will build our new theory. The last component (variable 3; displayed as V 3 ) will answer the significance of the why and how by analyzing the magnitude of the intervention. The analysis of magnitude will consist of two categories: How much of a global impact it would have or had, or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of Notes: V1 will identify the tactics and methodologies of intervention, V2 will identify the stated motivation of intervention, and V3 will identify magnitude of intervention then classify it as globally-motivated or self-motivated. Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 the United States. This article proposes to label them: Globally-motivated intervention and self-motivated intervention respectfully.
These three variables are applied to the four pre-selected elections and given a value-based metric of high vested interest or low vested interest.
Delimitations
This article seeks to apply the threefold methodology to the four previously stated elections that the United States interfered. These electoral interventions do not include any coup d'états or forced regime changes that have happened in the past. It only seeks to analyze strategic intervention where the United States utilizes covert or overt methods to influence rather than to coerce.
Definition of Terms
• Espionage is known colloquially as spying but in this context, espionage is defined as the art or practice of spy-craft, or using spy tactics to collect, analyze, or influence intelligence.
• Covert Action in the context of this article will retain its original definition from the Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign policy tool to further US interests in another country without the US Government being fully aware of it.
• Overt Action is a type of action used by the United States government that is public in nature, "operations… without concealment." • Foreign Electoral Intervention is the action of one country, covertly or overtly, intervening in another country's election or its subsequent results.
• Globally-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the election of another country for the interests, betterment, or well-being of the international audience.
• Self-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the election of another country to further the interests, betterment, or well-being of themselves.
• Predator-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to define the aggressor country that intervenes into the other country's election.
• Prey-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to define the receiving country that is having their election intervened. The Vested Interest Theory assistance was a known turning point in the outcome of the election. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The United States' methodology was notably different compared to the 1964 election. They focused primarily on a covert "anti-Allende propaganda" versus supporting any one candidate in the three-way race.
The United States spent $425,000 to produce this propaganda, labeling it a "scare campaign," of which included pamphlets, posters, and other campaign literature that linked a government or regime led by Allende to be connected to the oppression and failures of the Soviet Union. 30 The
United States also connected with local media and groomed journalists to produce anti-Allende articles, particularly through El Mercurio, a prominent Chilean newspaper.
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The main goal behind the campaign was to target the distressed economy of Chile and add financial and social panic that the country was on the brink of a financial disaster. While the economy was stressed, they released the anti-Allende propaganda that the United States hoped would connect Allende and his leftist ideology with the failing economy. They also aimed to break apart the UP by splitting the Radical Party off from the coalition.
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As mentioned in the background, the KGB was funding Allende's campaign and the UP coalition directly. These directed funds were utilized more efficiently than the US campaign, which contributed to Allende winning much of the vote. The then-CIA Director Richard Helms stated that the White House wanted him to "beat something with nothing," blaming them for the inefficient funds to run a complete intervention campaign. Since there was a Congressional inquiry into these elections specifically, the stated justification was published in the Church report. The accuracy or sincerity of the justification is something that can be explored later.
Whether the election was process or partisan motivated will again be determined by the Church report and supplemented by various academic articles.
V 3 : What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
The Church report and a few academic sources will again be used to determine if the intervention was globally or self-motivated. Andrew and
Mitrokhin's text on the KGB involvement in third-world countries will be used to determine the global or domestic impact of the intervention.
Bolivian Election
V 1 : What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?
The Bolivian election is different from the other elections in that covert action was not taken in the country to influence this specific country, so all political espionage happens with overt action and public policy. The primary sources that will be used to examine this election are academic articles that examine US foreign policy in South America, some that detail terrorist or guerrilla tactics, and others that discuss the general political instability of the country that led to the United States trying to intervene in the election. Because the intervention tactics in this election are overt in nature, the financial expenditure and the opposition campaign will be easier to assess. well documented, so the same sources will be used to examine this.
V 3 : What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying whether this intervention was globally or self-motivated will be derived from the same major academic sources as before and from those sources, we can determine the domestic or global impact that the intervention had.
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The research and data that will be used to determine the vested interest of the United States has been gathered in this section. In the following section, the research and data will be examined in the context of the vested interest theory and a conclusion will be derived to find the vested interest of the United States in the four elections that have been selected. When identifying the magnitude of an electoral intervention, based on the theory, it must be determined if the intervention was globally or self-motivated in nature. In F. Mark Wyatt's previous statement, that determines the stated motivation:
Italian Election
"I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George] Kennan...saying that, 'This election is coming up, and should the communists be able to form a government, should they win, our whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be undermined.' And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on it." 47 He states that a "coming up" of the communists will lead to the United States losing their position in the Mediterranean. Using this statement, we will explore whether this means that the US intervention was globally or self-motivated. Here is an excerpt from the Church Committee report with respect to propaganda operations:
"The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was propaganda. It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at a low level during "normal" times, then was cranked up to meet particular threats or to counter particular dangers… The most common form of a propaganda project is simply the development of "assets" in media organizations who can place articles or. be asked to write them… the covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included "black" propaganda-material falsely purporting to be the product of a particular individual or group. In the 1970 election, for instance, the CIA used "black" propaganda to sow discord between the Communists and the Socialists and between the national labor confederation and the Chilean Communist Party."
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Besides discussing propaganda, the Church Committee report also discusses other techniques of intervention such as supporting local media; gaining influence in Chilean institutions; supporting political parties; and direct efforts to promote a military coup. The report also provides a breakdown of expenditure of propaganda operations:
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TECHNIQUE AMOUNT
Propaganda for elections and other support for political parties $8,000,000
Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media $4,300,000
Influencing Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants, women) $900,000 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 United States hemispheric policy with special significance for Chilethe Alliance for Progress. There was little disagreement among policy-makers either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration or at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration that something had to be done about the alarming threat that Castro was seen to represent to the stability of the hemisphere."
52
In this excerpt, the Committee took note of Fidel Castro's rise to power and subsequent threat to the stability of the region as a motivation for electoral intervention and political espionage over the course of two elections. 
Bolivian Election
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
The results from the study will be summarized here following the previous formats of Election→V n . The previous background research from Literature Review will be used to answer these questions and determine the vested interest. These answers will be derived in the discussion below.
1948 Italian Election 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section will take the vested interest theory and apply it to the research conducted in previous section. The previous section research and the Summary of Results section will serve as the academic backing that this article will draw from to form any conclusions. The vested interest theory methodology will be summarized per each election and conclusions will be drawn from there.
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Italian Election
The 1948 There is speculation that the amount of money coming out of the Soviet compound equated to $8-$10 million a month. The US campaign outspent After analyzing the methodology of the theory and applying it to the research that has been previously conducted, it can be determined that 
Chilean Election
The 1964 
The analysis of the 1970 will encompass much of the same research and analysis completed in the 1964 election but will maintain a separate analysis. The tactics used in the 1970 election were negligible compared to the previous year's election. The United States utilized unspecific adcampaigns that were not targeting a particular demographic but instead were directed at preventing Salvador Allende's victory.
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The stated motivation was the same as the previous election and maintained partisan and globally motivated intervention. After this more unconventional analysis of this intervention compared to the more conventional electoral interventions previously examined, differences can be seen in practically all aspects of execution and these differences can shed some light on the effectiveness of different intervention tactics. The United States had a low vested interest in this election given by the lackluster tactics used that backfired in Evo Morales'
favor. If the United States wanted to implement a better strategy to influence Bolivian policy, they would have had a more comprehensive plan of attack with covert operations and allocated funds.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This article began with the articulation of a novel theory that would be used to identify the vested interest of the United States in foreign electoral interventions. It identified this vested interest by identifying three main questions:
• What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?
• What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?
• What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
To prove the academic viability of this new expanded theory, it was applied to four elections that the United States intervened in, analyzed them by the defined factors, and then rated the intervention on the metric of high vested interest or low vested interest. Though this election has a far more disappointing analysis, and a less than exciting background compared to the others, it felt pertinent to include an election that the US influenced that did not utilize conventional in other words covert means to provide well-rounded diversity to the application of the vested interest theory.
This is also important because of the scant research performed on foreign electoral intervention and that it is a burgeoning subfield of international relations and political science. Foreign electoral intervention will find its place in the study of espionage, political behavior, motivation, and political psychology.
